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In cognitive science, the rational analysis framework allows
modelling of how physical and social environments impose
information-processing demands onto cognitive systems. In
humans, for example, past social contact among individuals
predicts their future contact with linear and power functions.
These features of the human environment constrain the
optimal way to remember information and probably shape
how memory records are retained and retrieved. We offer
a primer on how biologists can apply rational analysis to
study animal behaviour. Using chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)
as a case study, we modelled 19 years of observational
data on their social contact patterns. Much like humans,
the frequency of past encounters in chimpanzees linearly
predicted future encounters, and the recency of past encounters
predicted future encounters with a power function. Consistent
with the rational analyses carried out for human memory,
these findings suggest that chimpanzee memory performance
should reflect those environmental regularities. In re-analysing
existing chimpanzee memory data, we found that chimpanzee
memory patterns mirrored their social contact patterns. Our
findings hint that human and chimpanzee memory systems
may have evolved to solve similar information-processing
problems. Overall, rational analysis offers novel theoretical
and methodological avenues for the comparative study
of cognition.
2016 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted
use, provided the original author and source are credited.
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1. Introduction
Roboticists face difficult problems when developing artificial memory systems. For one, those systems
inevitably come with limited capacity—there are physical bounds to how much information can be
stored. As a result, the system must have mechanisms that determine what information it should store
and, as new information poses additional demands for storage capacities, for how long it should maintain
older information. That is, the system must essentially make a bet about what information it will need
in current and future contexts. Furthermore, the system must quickly retrieve only that information
relevant to the context.
Biological information-processing systems face the same problems. Most notably, in coping with
biological (e.g. storage, computational) constraints, human memory must encode, maintain, prioritize
and recall information that is relevant to current or future stimuli in the environment, while removing
irrelevant records. How can such systems be best designed? In humans, one possibility is that the
cognitive system could take advantage of statistical regularities in the environment—a thesis that, in
cognitive science, has been prominently advanced by Anderson’s [1] rational analysis. This framework
proposes that cognition is an adaptive response to recurrent environmental structures and provides
a step-by-step approach to investigate how cognition solves those information-processing problems.
Specifically, rational analysis specifies (figure 1):
— what goals cognitive systems need to achieve;
— how the environment in which the systems act is structured;
— what computational constraints the systems face; and
— what cognitive processes would best achieve the goals given environmental structure and cognitive
limitations.
For instance, by mimicking general statistical regularities in human social, linguistic and other
environments, human forgetting and recall processes pose optimal solutions to the adaptive problems of
storing relevant information, retrieving that information when needed and forgetting those aspects of it
that are most likely irrelevant or outdated [3,4].
Anderson and co-workers’ [1,3–5] initial work on memory has since inspired research into other
important aspects of cognition such as whether humans optimally categorize objects in the environment
[6–8], optimally allocate cognitive and motor resources when interacting with objects in the world
[9] or represent numerical information [10]. Indeed, rational analysis has become a well-established
methodological framework in cognitive science [11], though some have criticized optimization models
of decision making because actual optimization in many real-world environments is infeasible [12].
Though biologists are often interested in how the environment shapes behaviour, they tend to focus
on the first components of rational analysis: adaptive goals and the structure of the environment
[13–16]. Cognitive processes and computational limits that shape how those adaptive goals are achieved,
tend to be under-studied in biology. Using our closest living phylogenetic relative—the chimpanzee
(Pan troglodytes)—as a case study, we offer a methodological primer of how biologists can use the
rational analysis approach to study how statistical patterns in the environment can shape cognitive
and behavioural systems across species. Specifically, we start by reviewing how cognitive scientists
have applied rational analysis to understanding human memory and environments. We then apply the
rational analysis framework by analysing chimpanzee environments and memory. We end by discussing
implications of our findings for the evolution of cooperation, cultural transmission, disease transmission
and cognitive evolution more generally.
1.1. Human memory
Do you remember what you had for lunch yesterday? How about last week or last month? Human
memory performance declines rapidly as the time between encoding and retrieving information
increases [17]. Rational analysis proposes that forgetting is an adaptive response to how information
is distributed in the world [3–5]. The statistical distribution of information in the environment shapes
what information the cognitive system might need to achieve its processing goals. Human memory
is like an Internet search engine that provides the cognitive system with important information when
needed [1]. According to rational analysis, the memory system meets the informational demands arising
from environmental stimuli by retrieving memories associated with these stimuli. The cognitive system
tries to make available the most useful memories by acting on the expectation that environmental stimuli
tend to reappear in predictable ways.
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Figure 1. Rational analysis. Anderson [1] describes a number of key steps used by the rational analysis framework. Here, we illustrate
these steps using adaptive memory as an example. (a) First, one must specify the goals of the cognitive system, which, for memory,
involves retrieving information based on triggers in the environment. For example, reading the word ‘Reagan’ should trigger memories
of the person Ronald Reagan, who was the President of the United States of America. (b) Next, one must measure the structure of the
environment. How frequently and recently one encounters anobject in the environment (e.g. reading theword ‘Reagan’) strongly predicts
the probability of encountering that object again, which is relevant for memory storage and retrieval. (c) Cognitive limitations of the
agentsmust also be considered to constrain the cognitive system. Given the sheer amount of information flowing into cognitive systems,
storage capacity is a severe limitation of memory. Humans are estimated to have an 11 billion-fold loss of information from the retina to
memory storage (information flow rates from [2]). (d) Finally, one must derive the optimal behavioural response to the environmental
structure based on the constraints on the system. For memory, frequency and recency of encounter with objects in the environment
should predict the probability of needing information about that object in the future. These steps can be iterated to refine the theory.
According to Anderson & Schooler [4], the cognitive system wagers that, as the recency and frequency
with which an individual encounters a piece of information increase, so does the probability that this
information will be needed to achieve future processing goals (henceforth: need probability). Conversely,
the more time that has passed since the last encounter, the more likely that memories associated
with the stimulus will not be needed and therefore can be forgotten. Memory, therefore, sets aside
outdated, irrelevant information, prioritizing retrieval of frequently and recently encountered—and thus
more relevant—information. As processing unneeded information comes with (e.g. metabolic) costs, the
cognitive system performs more efficiently by eliminating such information. Therefore, the accuracy of
retrieving memories about an object in the environment should depend on the frequency and recency of
encounters with that object.
Anderson and co-workers [18] used the rational analysis of memory to guide the development of a
memory system that is part of the ACT-R (Adaptive Control of Thought–Rational) theory of cognition.
ACT-R’s memory system tags pieces of information with activation values that govern the accessibility
of information, that is, whether and how quickly it can be retrieved. In other words, these activations
reflect the need probability, p, from the rational analysis of memory. More formally, the log odds (i.e.
ln[p/(1 – p)]) that a piece of information will be needed to achieve a processing goal is rooted in its
environmental pattern of occurrence. Specifically, activation, A, is determined by an equation that
strengthens and decays a piece of information’s activation according to the pattern with which it has
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been needed
A= ln
n∑
k=1
t−dk = ln
(
p
1− p
)
, (1.1)
where the information has been needed n times in the past at time lags of t1, t2, . . . , tn. Finally, d is a
decay parameter that captures the amount of forgetting, thus determining how much information about
an object’s environmental frequency is retained in memory. Across a wide variety of tasks and contexts,
this equation does a remarkable job of predicting memory accuracy and corresponding neural markers
in the brain [18–20].
This activation equation captures the relationships between memory accuracy and frequency and
recency of encounter that have been carefully measured by experimental psychologists. Memory
researchers measure frequency by counting the number of encounters with an object and recency by
tracking the amount of time since the object was last encountered. In his classic 1913 study, Ebbinghaus
[17] provided early data on how frequency and recency influenced his own recall of nonsense syllables.
He found that his memory accuracy increased with the frequency with which he practised the syllables.
Specifically, memory accuracy increased with frequency as a linear function: P= an+ b, where P
represents the probability of future encounter, n represents the number (frequency) of prior encounters,
and a and b represent free parameters.
Recency also predicted memory accuracy, but, rather than a linear relationship, it followed a
negatively accelerating function. Since then, memory researchers have tested two competing functions
that may account for this relationship: a power function, P= ct−d, where t represents the amount of
time that has passed since the last encounter (recency), and c and d represent free parameters, and an
exponential function, P= ce−dt. There is controversy in the literature regarding whether exponential
or power-law functions best capture forgetting. Nevertheless, many researchers favour power-law
functions for the relationship between memory and recency on both theoretical and empirical grounds
[4,21–23].
Thus, human memory performance demonstrates key regularities based on how objects are
encountered in the environment. The frequency and recency of encounters with information predict
memory accuracy with linear and power-law functions, respectively.
1.2. Human environment
Anderson & Schooler [4] hypothesized that memory performance reflects the statistical regularities with
which stimuli are encountered in the environment. With the memory data in hand, they explored this
hypothesis by measuring frequency and recency of encountering words in two linguistic environments:
children’s verbal interactions and headlines in The New York Times. In The New York Times example,
reading a word (e.g. Reagan) in a headline warrants retrieving information about the associated concept
(e.g. the President of the United States of America). Likewise, whenever someone speaks to a child, the
child must retrieve the word’s meaning.
In these two linguistic environments, the probability of encountering a particular word depended
on the frequency and recency of encounter [4]. To illustrate the point, figure 2a shows the pattern of
word usage over a 120 day period in The New York Times. As they did in Ebbinghaus’s [17] memory
data, the probability of encountering a word increased linearly with the frequency of prior encounter
(figure 3a) and decreased as a power function with the recency of encounters (figure 4a). That is, the
statistical relationships of both written and oral word usage in the environment matched the statistical
relationships of memory for words.
Anderson & Schooler’s [4] findings generalize beyond word usage to social contact data, as well.
Encountering a member of one’s social network often involves retrieval of information about relationship
status with that individual (e.g. relatedness, dominance status) or his/her past behaviour. For instance,
before attempting to engage a social partner in a cooperative interaction, it is probably useful to
remember whether the partner cooperated previously [25]. In an uncertain and variable world, larger
and more recent samples of information are more accurate [26] and information becomes out of date over
time [27,28]. Encountering social partners frequently and recently can provide more accurate predictions
about future behaviour than less frequent and older information; therefore, frequency and recency
of social contact are important but under-studied components of the social environment. Anderson
& Schooler and Pachur et al. [24] explicitly tested how frequency and recency of past social contact
predicted future contact. Anderson & Schooler used Anderson’s personal e-mail usage, and Pachur
et al. recorded face-to-face, phone, e-mail and other personal interactions in a sample of 40 people
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Figure 2. (a) Pattern of word usage in The New York Times over a 120 day period. Adaptedwith permission from Anderson & Schooler [4].
(b) Pattern of encounters between pairs of human participants over a 100 day period. Graph based on data from Pachur et al. [24].
(c) Pattern of encounters between pairs of wild chimpanzees over a 30 day period.
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Figure 3. In humans and chimpanzees, the frequency of past interactions linearly predicts the probability of future interactions. (a) The
frequency of a word appearing in The New York Times headlines in the previous 100 days predicts the probability of the word appearing
again on day 101. Adaptedwith permission fromAnderson & Schooler [4]. (b) The frequency of a human participant encountering a social
partner in the previous 30 days predicts the future probability of contact with that partner. Adapted with permission from Pachur et al.
[24]. (c) The frequency of a chimpanzee encountering a social partner in the previous 15 days predicts future contact with that partner.
Errors bars show binomial 95% CIs. Dashed line represents overall mean probability of contact in the dataset.
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Figure 4. In humans and chimpanzees, the recency of past encounters predicts the probability of future encounters consistent with a
power-law function. (a) The recency of a word appearing in The New York Times headlines predicts the probability of the word appearing
again. Recency is measured as the number of other words since the last occurrence of the target word. Adapted with permission from
Anderson & Schooler [4]. (b) The recency of a human participant encountering a social partner predicts the future probability of contact
with that partner. Adaptedwith permission fromPachur et al. [24]. (c) The recency of a chimpanzee encountering a social partner predicts
future contact with that partner. Error bars with binomial 95% CIs are too small to plot. Dashed line represents overall mean probability
of contact in dataset. Curves illustrate best fitting power functions.
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over 100 days. Both datasets exhibited the same lawful linear and power relationships observed in the
linguistic environments. Figure 2b shows examples of spacing patterns that match those of word usage in
The New York Times. Further, the frequency and recency of social encounters predicted future encounters
in linear and power-law-like ways, respectively (figures 3b and 4b).
In summary, patterns of memory accuracy reflect patterns of word usages and social contact in
humans. Specifically, memory performance is probably adapted to linear and power law relations in
the environment. Along with related findings for other cognitive processes (e.g. reasoning, resource
allocation, numerical representation [6–10]), the rational analyses of human memory and human
environments support the notion that information-processing systems adaptively exploit environmental
structures to solve information-processing problems.
1.3. The contribution of rational analysis
Our article makes three contributions to rational analysis and biology. First, we provide a methodological
primer of how biologists can apply rational analysis to study animal cognition. Second, in so doing, we
contribute to the comparative study of cognition across species, exploring parallels between humans and
their closest living relatives, chimpanzees (P. troglodytes). Third, we address the extent to which rational
analysis, as a research methodology, hinges on arguments about evolution.
1.3.1. Rational analysis for biologists
The rational analysis framework highlights the importance of exploring environmental pressures that
shape cognition, which can provide valuable insights into the biology of animal behaviour and cognition.
Cognitive ecology [29,30] is a subfield of biology that explores this problem. A classic example of this
approach is the extensive work tying spatial memory performance to the foraging ecology of caching
food. Species that scatter caches of food across a territory face the difficult challenge of remembering
where they hid the food. Many researchers have argued that the pressure of remembering the location
of caches should select for better spatial memory [31–33]. In fact, species that cache food more also have
better spatial memory than species that cache less, even outside of the caching context [34–36].
Though cognitive ecology actively pursues the general question of how the environment shapes
cognition, the rational analysis approach takes this a step further by specifying more precisely patterns
that are observed in the environment to more strongly test the environment’s influence on cognition.
Rather than only stating that two species have different environments and should, therefore, have
different cognition, rational analysis enables us to more precisely model how the environment shapes
the cognition of species, and to what extent the cognitive system optimally solves the adaptive problems
posed by the environment.
This modelling approach is rarely used in biology. An exception is a study by van der Vaart et al. [37],
who developed a cognitive model of cache recovery behaviour. In the spirit of our opening example from
robotics, they developed ‘virtual birds’ that had to remember their caches. In doing so, the authors faced
the problem of designing an artificial cognitive system that could encode, store and retrieve memories
of cache locations. They used the quantitative insights of how frequency and recency of encountering
objects in the world (food to cache) influence memory to retrieve those objects. Their model incorporated
Anderson & Schooler’s [4] memory functions derived from rational analysis to model how the memory
system interacted with the environment to solve the problem of cache recovery. Though this used insights
derived from rational analysis, it did not directly apply rational analysis to cognitive evolution. Here, we
provide an application of rational analysis to biology.
1.3.2. Comparative rational analysis
Cognitive scientists interested in investigating the role of the environment on cognition typically test
this in humans by varying task environments [38,39]. Humans, however, are limited in the range of
environments that they experience often enough to influence cognition. The comparative approach in
biology, however, allows for another method for exploring the role of the environment on cognition. As
different species face different environmental pressures, comparing across species allows biologists to
compare whether different species with similar environments share aspects of behaviour and cognition
[40–42].
The comparative approach can provide a powerful way to assess the utility of rational analysis.
In discussing the usefulness of rational analysis for understanding the adaptive nature of memory,
for instance, Shettleworth [41] lamented that we have few tests of how cognitive properties match
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properties of the environment in non-human species. Though van der Vaart et al. [37] used the insights
of rational analysis to model animal memory, few have used the steps of rational analysis (figure 1) to
better understand cognition (but see [43]). We leverage the comparative method to test the link between
environment and cognition in another species—chimpanzees. This not only applies the rational analysis
framework to a new species but also explores the evolutionary underpinnings of human cognition
by comparing our environments and memory to those of our closest living relatives. Though humans
demonstrate reliable patterns of both memory and the distribution of information across multiple social
environments (word usage and social contact), it remains unclear whether these patterns are uniquely
human or whether other species also demonstrate them.
Though one might expect that frequency and recency of encounters should predict future contact
in a general sense, rational analysis predicts specifically that the same patterns observed in the
environment will also be observed in the cognition. Therefore, for species with different social structures,
frequency and recency of past contact may have different patterns predicting future contact. Rational
analysis predicts that, whatever the pattern, it will be reflected in cognition. This allows biologists to
leverage the diversity of social or other environments across species to make predictions about their
cognitive evolution.
1.3.3. Natural selection as a mechanism of rational analysis
Anderson & Schooler’s [4] and Pachur et al.’s [24] work illustrates how much can be learned by exploring
how the human cognitive system adapts to and exploits environmental structure to achieve key
information-processing goals. There are, however, at least two mechanisms that can generate adaptive
behaviour and cognition: learning and natural selection. If memory reflects the environment due to
learning, memory mechanisms may change over an organism’s lifetime due to environmental demands.
In contrast, if natural selection is the mechanism generating an adaptive response to the environment,
then, over evolutionary time, individuals that had memory mechanisms that reflected the environment
would have more efficient memory performance, leading to better foraging success, enhanced mating
opportunities and more positive social interactions. Anderson [1,44] proposed evolution by natural
selection as a potential mechanism of rational analysis, but most work in this area has remained silent on
the role of evolution.
Though others have embraced the Anderson & Schooler [4] approach to adaptive forgetting
in non-human animals [37,45], some remain sceptical of its utility. Shettleworth [41], for example,
questioned whether newspaper headlines reflect the environment in which our memory systems
evolved. Shettleworth, therefore, challenged the evolutionary nature of rational analysis. Anderson &
Schooler did not claim that the memory patterns are necessarily evolutionarily adapted, leaving open
the possibility that they could be learned. But a cognitive ecology approach might hypothesize that
memory systems are products of natural selection, and, therefore, the observed memory patterns may be
evolutionary adaptations to the structure of ancestral environments. Indeed, the power law relationships
found by Anderson & Schooler and Pachur et al. [24] are common in nature [46] and might well generalize
from modern-day newspaper environments to ancestral (e.g. hunting, mating, social) environments. We
contribute to this discussion by establishing to what extent the cognitive and environmental functions
found in humans generalize to other species.
2. The rational analysis of chimpanzee memory
Here, we extend the rational analysis framework to a phylogenetically closely related species—the
chimpanzee. Like Anderson & Schooler [4] investigated in humans, we are interested in chimpanzee
memory as an information-processing problem. To begin the rational analysis, we establish the goals of
the system (figure 1a). In our case, the goal of memory is to quickly retrieve memories relevant to the
environmental situation at hand.
Second, we must measure the structure of the environment (figure 1b). We posit that encountering
other individuals in one’s group is an important environmental event for memory because it requires
the retrieval of information about relationship status—including relatedness and dominance—with that
individual, as well as that individual’s specific past behaviours, such as previous cooperative interactions
and mating advances or rejections. Previous encounters probably predict future encounters, and the
memory system could leverage these patterns to predict what information should be retained for future
use. Therefore, we measure patterns of social contact as a key aspect of the environment that may
shape memory.
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Third, we must assess the cognitive limitations on the system (figure 1c). Chimpanzees face constraints
on storage space for memory, perhaps with stricter limitations than humans because they have about one
third of the number of neurons that humans do [47]. With storage space at a premium, forgetting clears
out room for quick retrieval of more relevant information.
Finally, we can integrate the previous three components to determine the optimal cognitive response
(figure 1d) to achieve the goals of the memory system given the structure of the environment and
cognitive constraints. For chimpanzee memory performance, we would predict that forgetting functions
should reflect the probability of needing information in the environment. So, the relationship between
forgetting and recency should mimic the relationship between social contact and recency. We, therefore,
measure chimpanzee’s forgetting functions.
Following Anderson & Schooler [4] and Pachur et al. [24], we analysed social contact patterns in
wild chimpanzees and tested whether the frequency and recency of past within-group encounters
predicted future contact. With the environmental patterns in hand, we then modelled chimpanzee
memory performance to compare it to the structure of their social environment. Combined, these steps
allow us to apply rational analysis to another species.
2.1. Chimpanzee social contact
2.1.1. Environmental data
We used 19 years of data from the Kanyawara community of chimpanzees in Kibale National Park,
Uganda from July 1988 to June 2006. During this time frame, the Kanyawara community ranged in
an area about 38 km2 [48]. These chimpanzees were habituated to the presence of human observers
without provisioning. The size and composition of the community remained relatively stable, averaging
about 40–50 individuals (9–12 adult males and 12–15 adult females) during that time and totalling 143
chimpanzees over the course of the entire study period. Each day, two or more Ugandan field assistants
located a party of chimpanzees by using nesting data from the previous day, listening for vocalizations or
visiting recent feeding sites. The observers followed the party for as long as possible, typically until the
animals built their night nests. If the party split, they followed the larger subgroup. At 15 min intervals,
one observer used scan sampling [49] to record which chimpanzees were present in a party, regardless
of age or sex. While such party-level follows may increase the number of observations of more social
individuals, daily follows over several years ensure that all individuals were adequately sampled.
We converted the scan sample data into a matrix with all 10 153 possible pairings of the 143
chimpanzees as rows and all 4695 days of observation as columns. If an observer recorded a particular
pair of chimpanzees as in the same group at the same time at least once for a particular day, we scored
the pair as in contact for that day (contact day). If no observers scored the chimpanzees in the same group
and either of the two chimpanzees was observed for at least 70% of the day, we scored the pair as not
in contact for that day (no contact day). Otherwise, we scored the pair as ‘missing’ (NA) for that day. The
70% value provided a compromise between wanting to ensure that contacts were not missed and the
resulting reduction in number of data points. We scored as missing (NA) all days in which a particular
pair could not possibly interact because one member was not alive or was not in the community. About
90% of the 47-million cell matrix was scored as ‘missing’ and could not be used in this analysis. Despite
the sparseness of the matrix, 4.9 million complete dyad observations remained for our analyses.
2.1.2. Analysis
By analysing their environments, Anderson & Schooler [4] asked whether the pattern of word use over
100 days predicted the probability of use on day 101—much like a typical memory experiment that
assesses the likelihood of recalling an item after n practice trials (e.g. [50]). Aggregating over items that
appeared n times (e.g. 52) in a window of m days (e.g. 100) yields an empirical proportion (e.g. 52/100).
This proportion served Anderson & Schooler as an estimate of the probability that an item used n times
in m days will be needed on day m+ 1. In addition to computing such need probabilities based on the
frequency of prior encounter, Anderson & Schooler examined the predictive power of recency: they
estimated the need probability of recall on day m+ 1 as a function of how many days had passed since
an item was last needed in a window of m days.
As Anderson & Schooler [4] did for humans, we assessed the probability of a chimpanzee needing to
remember information about a conspecific in two ways. First, to estimate the need probability based on
the frequency of past encounters, we used a moving window of 16 consecutive observation days with
only one missing value allowed, resulting in 307 810 windows. We used a window of 16 days to balance
9rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
R.Soc.opensci.3:160293
................................................
the need between having large enough samples per frequency and having enough frequencies to detect
patterns. We allowed a single missing value in the window to increase the number of windows we could
analyse. For each 16 day window, we recorded the number of encounters for each pair of chimpanzees
over the first 15 days (frequency) and the probability of contact on day 16. We report the mean (±binomial
95% CIs) values averaged over all chimpanzee pairs.
Second, to estimate the need probability based on the recency of past encounters, we computed the
probability of contact for a pair based on the number of consecutive days (with the possibility of one
missing value) since the last contact. Again, we report the mean (±binomial 95% CIs) values averaged
over all chimpanzee pairs. We used a maximum recency of 15 days to match the frequency data. This
resulted in 1.8 million recency events. Using binomially distributed maximum-likelihood estimation, we
calculated the corrected Akaike Information Criterion (AICc) values that correct for bias associated with
small sample sizes [51] to test power and exponential functions with these data.
We analysed the data using R Statistical Software [52] v. 3.2.5 and packages bbmle [53], car [54], Hmisc
[55], lattice [56] and Rcpp [57]. Data and R code are available in electronic supplementary materials and
on the Dryad Data Repository (http://datadryad.org/) [58].
2.1.3. Chimpanzee social contact patterns
At a broad level, the spacing patterns observed in chimpanzees mirror those observed in humans
(figure 2c). In addition, figure 3c shows that the pattern of frequency of encounters over a 15 day
period predicts future encounters among wild chimpanzees. The chimpanzees’ social contact pattern
exhibits regularities that match the human ones (figure 3a,b). Anderson & Schooler [4] reported a linear
relationship between need probability and frequency. A linear regression demonstrates that future need
probability is linearly related to past need probability also in chimpanzees (p= 0.14+ 0.05n; R2= 0.95).
Matching the human data, need probability strongly correlates with frequency of contact. If chimpanzee
encounters are distributed at random, they would have a constant probability of contact, regardless of
frequency (figure 3c).
Figure 4c shows the probability of encountering another chimpanzee as a function of the number
of days that passed since the last encounter. Again, the chimpanzee results match the negatively
accelerating function observed in the human data (figure 4a,b). The power function fits the data better
than the exponential function (power AICc: 84.2; exponential AICc: 98.2; evidence ratio= 1× 1010,
suggesting that the power function has over 11 million times the weight of evidence relative to the
exponential function). This finding matches the power function reported for humans by Anderson &
Schooler [4] and Pachur et al. [24]. Moreover, if the chimpanzees moved around their territory at
random, this should produce an exponential pattern of encounters with recency [59]. Our power-law
data, therefore, reflect structure in chimpanzee social contact.
2.2. Chimpanzee memory
Anderson & Schooler [4] used cognitive data (figure 5a) to inform predictions about patterns in the
human environment. Schooler & Anderson [5] used statistical patterns in the environment to make
novel behavioural predictions. Similarly, our chimpanzee social environment data allow us to reverse the
direction and make predictions about chimpanzee cognition. The power-law pattern observed in social
contact data (figure 4c) provides a critical regularity of the environment in which chimpanzee memory
must perform. Based on these data, we predicted that chimpanzee memory retention would also follow
a power law, as a response to the pattern in the social environment.
To test this prediction, we combined data from chimpanzee delayed matching-to-sample tasks across
three prior studies [60–62]. These tasks presented a ‘sample’ object to remember, hid the sample from
view for a fixed period, and then presented the sample and a distractor object. If the chimpanzee chose
the sample object, it received a food reward; otherwise, it received nothing. Experimenters varied the
retention interval within chimpanzees, allowing us to model memory functions. Though these data have
been available for decades, no one has fitted power and exponential functions to the data to test which
function best accounts for their forgetting patterns. We found that, like the chimpanzee social contact
data, the power function fits the chimpanzee memory data better than the exponential function (power
AICc: 53.9; exponential AICc: 62.3; evidence ratio= 54.1; figure 5b).
These data indicate that chimpanzee memory makes a similar bet as human memory: namely,
the more time that has passed since encountering a stimulus, the more likely it is that the stimulus
will not need to be recalled in the future, and memories of such stimuli can be forgotten. Thus, the
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Figure 5. (a) Ebbinghaus’s [17] classic forgetting function in humans is based on retention assessed as per cent savings in relearning a
list of nonsense syllables. (b) The chimpanzee forgetting function is based on two-sample delayed matching-to-sample tasks [60–62].
Curves illustrate best fitting power functions.
statistical regularities carry over from chimpanzee social environments to their cognition, as predicted
by rational analysis.
3. Discussion
Field data on chimpanzee group composition demonstrate that the frequency and recency of their
social contact predict future contact in a reliable way, with linear and power functions, respectively.
Experimental data on chimpanzee memory indicate that their probability of forgetting depends directly
on the recency with which they encountered the memory stimuli. Critically, the forgetting function shows
the same relationship with recency as social contact patterns, namely a power-law decrease with recency.
Combined, these results provide (i) a key case study of the application of rational analysis to biological
systems, (ii) an opportunity to employ rational analysis to better understand comparative aspects of
human and non-human cognition, and (iii) a chance to explore natural selection as a mechanism relevant
for rational analysis.
3.1. Applying rational analysis
Psychologist Walter Mischel once related that ‘psychologists treat our theories like toothbrushes; no self-
respecting person wants to use anyone else’s’ [63, p. 444]. We agree, and would like to add that this
is probably also true for cross-disciplinary research: too infrequently do research methodologies and
theories developed in one field or discipline carry over into neighbouring ones. This article makes such
an attempt to bridge disciplinary boundaries.
The rational analysis framework posits that cognitive processes are adapted to solve problems
that the environment imposes on agents. Though animal researchers have incorporated the fruits of
rational analysis labours [37], few have directly applied the rational analysis approach to understand the
evolution of cognition in other species. We stepped through the components of rational analysis (figure 1)
to ask to what extent chimpanzee memory performance matches the probability of needing information
in a social environment. Field and experimental data show that chimpanzee memory performance
follows the same statistical pattern—a power function—as chimpanzee social contact.
Rational analysis does not always predict linear and power-law patterns, however. The environment
acts as a constraint on the cognitive system, so different species (or even populations of the same species)
may face different patterns in their environment. For social contact, some species have more cohesive
or less structured social organization. The cohesive group composition of baboons, for instance, would
not result in the same power-law pattern of recency observed in chimpanzees because baboon group
members are in constant contact. Likewise, less structured groups such as large flocks of birds or swarms
of insects may not show this pattern because previous contact simply does not predict future contact.
Different social organizations result in different patterns of contact.
In addition to social organization, other factors impose information-processing demands. Caching
species such as Clark’s nutcrackers (Nucifraga columbiana) face strong selective pressures to remember
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where they have hidden seeds in the winter [64]. The seasons impose tight schedules on how often these
birds need to recall the locations of their food deposits. But these birds have few social interactions, so
their memory systems may be tuned more for the statistical patterns of cache recovery rather than social
contact. Thus, we must characterize the statistical structure of each species individually before predicting
its effect on cognition.
Our work answers the call of Shettleworth [41], who lamented the lack of applications of rational
analysis to other species. We offer a ‘proof-of-concept’ that rational analysis can be a valuable tool used in
biology to better understand cognition and behaviour in other species. Carefully measuring regularities
in the physical and social environment can provide insights into optimal solutions to a range of problems
faced by animals, including foraging, mating, predator avoidance and navigation.
3.2. Rational analysis in humans and chimpanzees
Systematically exploring parallels and differences between our and other hominid’s information
processing can offer key insights into the evolution of hominid cognition [65–67]. We find that the
chimpanzee social environment and memory performance exhibit similar statistical regularities as those
found in humans. There are at least two possible explanations for the origin of this similarity. First, both
species share fission–fusion social dynamics [68]. Chimpanzees live in fission–fusion societies in which
members of ‘communities’ of about 45 individuals (but sometimes more than 150 individuals [69]) travel
in fluid subgroups that change in size and composition over the course of hours or days [70]. Humans
show similarly fluid social dynamics [68]. With the dynamic nature of fission–fusion systems, recent and
frequent contact with social partners predicts that future contact is likely. Whereas, when a group fission
occurs, subgroups may travel to different parts of the range, thereby reducing the probability of future
contact. The fission–fusion dynamics exhibited by chimpanzees and humans may provide a unique
adaptive pressure on cognition because group members are encountered after varying intervals. Further
modelling efforts are needed to determine whether the fission–fusion dynamics uniquely generate the
contact patterns observed here.
An alternative explanation is that humans and chimpanzees share these statistical regularities not
because they share fission–fusion dynamics but because they share an evolutionary history independent
of these dynamics. That is, the linear and power-law patterns of frequency and recency on future contact
may simply be phylogenetic constraints. To fully test between these two possibilities, we must conduct
similar rational analyses for other species that vary in their social structure. Regardless of whether these
patterns are adaptations to fission–fusion dynamics or are phylogenetic constraints, the fact that humans
and chimpanzees share these patterns hints at a shared social environment that has critical implications
for cognitive evolution.
3.3. Mechanisms of rational analysis
A key open question raised by Anderson & Schooler’s [4] findings is whether the match of memory
and the environment results from memory adapting to an individual’s environment over its lifetime
(learning) or from memory adapting to a population’s environment over evolutionary time (natural
selection). Shettleworth [41] was sceptical that Anderson & Schooler’s patterns of word usage in
newspaper headlines reflected a general property of human environments that were present during the
evolution of human memory. Our data speak to this question.
The chimpanzees included in our social contact pattern dataset lived in natural conditions and
exhibited natural social contact patterns. The chimpanzees in our memory data, however, lived in
captivity. Captive chimpanzees typically live in constant contact with their group mates, which would
generate different patterns of social contact; recency and frequency would not predict future contact in
a fixed group. The memory data, therefore, was probably not generated by a mechanism that learned
patterns of social contact over the lifetime of the chimpanzee, because these patterns of contact will not
follow a power law for captive chimpanzees. The fact that memory performance in captive chimpanzees
reflects social contact in wild chimpanzees provide evidence to cognitive scientists that natural selection
can act as the mechanism that matches the properties of cognition to the properties of the environment
as suggested by rational analysis.
3.4. Rational analysis of cognitive and behavioural evolution
Rational analysis parallels the fields of cognitive ecology [29,30] and evolutionary psychology [71] by
emphasizing the tight link between the environment and cognition. It goes beyond these fields; however,
by more explicitly measuring the statistical structure of the environment to predict what kind of cognitive
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system would best solve the problems faced by that environment. Therefore, this approach treats many
aspects of cognition as adaptations to environmental problems rather than just constraints. Biologists,
for example, often consider memory to be a constraint on the cognitive system due to limited storage
capacity [25,72]. Rational analysis maintains that—though constraints on capacity exist—memory is an
adaptation with properties that solve the adaptive problem of retrieving information relevant to the
situation at hand.
But rational analysis extends beyond memory. Patterns of social contact are relevant to a number
of key biological problems, including the evolution of cooperation, cultural transmission and disease
transmission. Quantitatively assessing aspects of the social environment, such as contact patterns, can
provide critical insights into these issues. Existing models of cooperation, for example, tend to ignore
such contact patterns, though they may incorporate broader-scale social networks. Yet, the pattern of
contact probably has important implications for models of cooperation such as reciprocity; frequency
and recency of interactions, combined with memory constraints, may determine what types of reciprocal
strategies can evolve [24,25,73]. Frequent and recent encounters, for instance, aid remembering past
defections. But spaced-out encounters aid forgetting and, therefore, forgiving mistaken defections. The
beneficial and detrimental roles of memory will interact with social contact to influence the evolution
of cooperation. Furthermore, contact patterns directly shape transmission of both cultural information
and disease. Frequency and recency of contact regulate the magnitude and timing of exposure to memes
and pathogens, thereby determining the extent and rate of their spread [74–76]. Thus, these patterns of
contact provide metrics of the social environment that influence key cognitive and disease-based factors
critical to behavioural evolution.
4. Conclusion
Herbert Simon once remarked that ‘Human rational behavior . . . is shaped by a scissors whose two
blades are the structure of task environments and the computational capabilities of the actor’ [77,
p. 7]. Though Simon focused on the current environment, his notion also applies to the evolutionary
environment. Our findings hint that human memory may have evolved as an adaptation that is
functional with respect to the statistical properties of the environment. The rational analysis framework
allows us to understand how the statistical properties of our and other species’ environments align and
differ, so that we can fully grasp in what respects human information-processing capacities are unique
and in what respect they are shared with other species. It is perhaps only once we have examined how the
statistical properties of human environments and memory performance differ from and resemble those
of other species that we may grasp how adaptive human and other species’ cognitive capacities really are.
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